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Abstract: The discussion on Aspasius’ philosophical background has benefited
in recent years from a wide consensus. According to this consensus, Aspasius
should be regarded as a Peripatetic, or even as an “orthodox Peripatetic”
(Barnes’ phrase). It is true that Aspasius’ commentary is generally in tune with
Aristotle. It is true that he shows an extensive knowledge of Aristotelian research
pertinent for the discussions and that he uses Aristotelian concepts, principles,
and doctrines with ease as if they were his own, thus denoting an old assimila-
tion of those materials and a long accommodation to them. In a word, it is true
that Aspasius is an Aristotelian. He is, however, as I will try to show in this
paper, an Aristotelian strongly influenced by Stoicism. I will do so by selecting
those points from Aspasius’ commentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics
where the Stoic influence is most flagrantly evident, namely in his interpretation
of art (τέχνη), his conception of continence and incontinence and, especially,
his interpretation of the relation between happiness, virtue, and external goods
in Aristotle.
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The Consensus
The discussion on Aspasius’ philosophical background has benefited in recent
years from a wide consensus.
A good example of this consensus is the position Barnes sustains on
the matter in his excellent “Introduction to Aspasius”, where he states the
following1:
Next, Aspasius’ philosophical position. Galen calls him a Peripatetic, and it is plain that
his pupil taught Galen Peripatetic philosophy. Porphyry strongly implies that he was a
Peripatetic. The commentary on the Ethics regularly presents Aristotle’s views as though
*Corresponding author: António Pedro Mesquita, Department of Philosophy, Lisbon University,
Alameda da Universidade, Lisboa 1600-214, Portugal, E-mail: apmesquita@netcabo.pt
1 Barnes (1999, 5).
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they were true – that is to say, it gives the impression of having been written by a
Peripatetic. Nor is this in the least surprising: if you wrote commentaries on Aristotle’s
works in the second century AD, then the chances are that you were of the Peripatetic
persuasion.
And, after a page of possible objections, he declares2:
Such general considerations make it plain that, whatever nuances and shadows might be
added by a detailed scrutiny, the “Platonist” passages provide no reason to think that
Aspasius was anything other than an orthodox Peripatetic – orthodox, that is to say, for his
time and in the eyes of his contemporaries.
Later, he concludes his remarks on the subject by saying3:
The commentary itself, on every page, shows a dutiful and orthodox Peripatetic. We
should [therefore] continue to believe that the commentary on the Ethics was written by
a Peripatetic – by the Peripatetic Aspasius who taught Galen’s teacher.
In fact, it is true that Aspasius’ commentary is generally in tune with Aristotle.
It is true that he shows an extensive knowledge of Aristotelian research
pertinent for the discussions found especially in Posterior Analytics, Topics, On
the Soul and Metaphysics. He uses Aristotelian concepts, principles, and doc-
trines with ease as if they were his own, thus denoting an old assimilation of
those materials and a long accommodation to them.4
In a word, it is true that Aspasius is an Aristotelian.
He is, however, as Barnes himself acknowledges, an Aristotelian of the first
to second centuries A.D. And on several points he is – as I will try to show,
contra Barnes and the consensus that has been put in place regarding this
matter – an Aristotelian strongly influenced by Stoicism.
2 Barnes (1999, 6) (the emphasis is mine).
3 Barnes (1999, 8).
4 One of the signs of the extensive knowledge Aspasius has of Aristotle’s works is the probable
use of the Protrepticus in 1.15-24. In fact, the argument offered in that passage to support the
statement that political science, although inferior “in respect to value” (κατὰ τὸ τίμιον) to
contemplative philosophy, is superior to it “in respect to necessity” (κατὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον), strik-
ingly resembles the one that occurred in a lost exhortative writing by Cicero, the Hortensius (that
we know through Augustine), and in the Protrepticus of Iamblichus, two texts that Aristotelian
scholarship believe to have their common origin in Aristotle’s Protrepticus and which the first
modern editor of the fragments of Aristotle’s lost works, Valentin Rose, has, consequently,
included in his reconstruction of this book: see Augustine, De trinitate XIV ix 12, and
Iamblichus, Protrepticus 9, 52.16-54.5 Pistelli (Rose3 58=Ross 12).
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Of course, in order to do this, I would probably need to begin by clarifying
what, in my view, it meant to be an “orthodox Peripatetic” in practical philoso-
phy back in the first to second centuries A.D. (even if only “for his time and in
the eyes of his contemporaries”), since it is this qualification that, in the end, I
am challenging with respect to its suitability to describe Aspasius’ stance.
Otherwise – some could say – chances are that I will be confronting
Aspasius with a pure, unpolluted, unhistorical idea of Aristotelianism that
never existed, not even in Aristotle’s times nor for Aristotle himself. Indeed,
like a modern Aristotelian necessarily builds her peculiar Aristotelianism within
the framework of modern philosophical problems and concepts – which inevi-
tably condition her reading and affect her degree of proximity with the letter of
Aristotle’s texts in this or that regard – so Aspasius, in the first to second
centuries A.D., also complied, even if he was not aware of it, with the philoso-
phical underpinnings of his age and, for this reason, a considerable amount of
integration of Peripatetic, Platonic and Stoic ingredients, in variable dosages
and proportions, should be expected to be found in his thought.
All of this is true. However, it will be consensually conceded, I trust, that at
no time would an orthodox Peripatetic cross those doctrinal “red lines” that are
drawn by Aristotle’s texts themselves.
Hence, in order to discuss the alleged orthodoxy of Aspasius’ commentary,
I am not actually compelled to speculate about what an orthodox Peripatetic
back in the first to second centuries A.D. would be like, but only to put forward
some doctrinal boundaries within Aristotelian moral theory that no orthodox
Peripatetic would ever cross, particularly those that this commentary was inevi-
tably bound to stumble upon sooner or later, because they form part of the
philosophical backbone of the Ethics.
These are some basic, and, I think, quite unequivocal boundaries of the sort:
(1) happiness is the highest human good and, as such, the ultimate goal of
human life; (2) happiness involves virtue in an essential way and, therefore, is
not possible without virtue; (3) being virtuous is, however, not sufficient to be
happy; (4) moral virtue consists in a mean between excess and deficiency;
(5) some moral qualities and attitudes, like honor (τιμή), continence
(ἐγκράτεια), modesty (αἰδώς), and shame (αἰσχύνη) are not technically virtues.
Accordingly, the following would be unmistakable heterodox Peripatetic
theses at any point in time: (1) happiness is not, or is not the only, ultimate
goal of human life; (2) happiness is possible without virtue; (3) happiness
depends ultimately only on virtue; (4) moral virtue does not consists in a
mean; (5) honor, continence, or shame are virtues.
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We could proceed further, but it would be pointless since these theses
provide the theoretical framework we will be dealing with.
However, there is an objection that could be raised here. Indeed – one could
reply – at no time would what we now consider an orthodox Peripatetic cross the
abovementioned doctrinal red lines. But does this imply that, if at a given time
someone actually crossed one of these red lines, she could not be considered an
orthodox Peripatetic at that time? As a matter of fact, Barnes cautiously qualified
his assertion, by adding: “orthodox, that is to say, for his time and in the eyes of
his contemporaries”.
Well, neither I nor anybody really can exactly estimate what could have
been seen as orthodox or heterodox in Aspasius’ time, let alone in the eyes of his
contemporaries. Historical evidence is seriously missing here and this is also
why some more digging into the philosophy of the early imperial times is most
welcome. Nevertheless, I think we can all agree on this: if during someone’s own
time, and in the eyes of her contemporaries, everything and anything whatso-
ever can be seen as orthodox – even crossing the red lines that define the very
core of orthodoxy – then it becomes altogether meaningless to speak of ortho-
doxy. Therefore, if Aspasius was not really an orthodox Peripatetic in this sense
albeit he was regarded as one in his time “and in the eyes of his contempor-
aries”, this only shows that no true Peripatetic orthodoxy existed during that
time (which, incidentally, is very likely, since he lived during the golden age of
eclecticism) and, therefore, the testimony of his contemporaries can hardly
count for the establishment of anyone’s orthodoxy in any legitimate sense of
the word.
Besides, the fact remains that the principle that presides over the notion of
doctrinal boundaries, or “red lines,” as we have introduced above, is that they
are drawn by Aristotle’s texts themselves. From this point of view, the moment
in time at which we consider the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of Aspasius, or any
other figure of the past, is of no consequence. And such are the red lines in
Aristotelian ethics that we have put forward above.
Now, we should assess Aspasius’ “orthodoxy” in his commentary on the
Nicomachean Ethics against this background. And it is therefore against this
background that I will develop my allegations of Stoic influence in Aspasius’
work.
The conclusion will be not that Aspasius was not an Aristotelian, for he
definitively was one, but that his peculiar Aristotelianism was so deeply and
severely tainted by Stoicism that it would be seriously misleading to call him an
“orthodox Peripatetic,” even if he was thought to be one during “his time and in
the eyes of his contemporaries”.
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The Dissensus
It is beyond doubt that Aspasius knows Stoicism well, that he mentions it and
even criticizes it in the name of sound Aristotelian principles.5 This is especially
the case in his discussion of emotions, where Aspasius definitely takes Aristotle’s
side against the Stoics.6 The question is if such an opposition remains when he
does not mention it explicitly.
Let me explain this point.
Without trying to put Aspasius’ commentary on the psychoanalytic couch, it
seems defensible to say that he “Stoicizes,” if not every time – as that would be
an exaggeration –,7 at least several times when he seems not to be aware of
doing so, that is to say, when, commenting on Aristotle, he seems oblivious to
how close to Stoicism his commentary comes and how much in opposition to
Aristotle both Stoicism and his commentary really are.
In this sense, Aspasius’ Peripatetic “infidelities,” if any, are mostly
unwanted and apparently unwittingly done.
There are, of course, also those cases in which Aspasius is simply breathing
the air of the times.
For instance, in his translation of the commentary on book I of the Ethics,
David Konstan has registered some cases where Aspasius uses logical vocabu-
lary of Stoic origin,8 but there is no reason to assume that the contamination is
more than simply linguistic.9
5 Throughout the text, I will always speak of Stoicism in general, without distinction between
authors, even when it is possible to make one, and according to the later form taken up by their
doctrines, since that form is, presumably, the one familiar to Aspasius.
6 42.27-47.2. On this matter, see Sorabji (1999, 96–106).
7 It would be an exaggeration to say “every time” because Katerina Ierodiakonou, for instance,
has clearly shown, in her study “Aspasius on Perfect and Imperfect Virtues”, that Aspasius would
have been led to reject fundamental aspects of the Stoic theory of virtue, on behalf of the
Aristotelian theory, in coherence with the principles he is committed to in his commentary on
the Nicomachean Ethics, without, however, entering into direct and explicit polemic against the
Stoics.
8 Namely, the use of the expression “hypothetically” (ὑποθετικῶς) in 12.8 and 12.20-21 and the
expression “categorically” (κατηγορικῶς) in 12.10: see nn. 31–32, p. 190.
9 David Sedley mentions another case of linguistic contamination in Sedley (1999, 169, n. 12):
“Aristotle’s words at 1152a14-15 are ho eidôs kai theôrôn, ‘one who knows and is thinking about
it’. Significantly, Aspasius fails to recognise Aristotle’s standard term, theôrein, for actively
using or ‘contemplating’ some knowledge that one has, and instead sees an allusion to
‘theorems’ of practical reasoning – an un-Aristotelian notion, although one which by his day
had been put fully on the map by the intellectualist ethics of the Stoics.”
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And Jonathan Barnes himself accurately notes that the process of dissemi-
nation of the philosophical idiolects of the different schools throughout
Antiquity, especially the most influential ones such as the Stoic and the
Platonic, was produced with such assimilations and intersections that, in most
cases, it is impossible to determine a philosophical influence solely on the basis
of the language used by an author.10
This occurs, for example, with the presentation of the Aristotelian doctrine
in Diogenes Laertius’ book V. Contrary to what many authors sustain,11 I find
that Diogenes is remarkably rigorous in this presentation, despite his use of
some elements of the Stoic philosophical language and the adoption of a Stoic
scheme of approach, which can be explained by the broad diffusion of the
Portico’s conceptual lexicon throughout Antiquity.12
This is not, however, what occurs in Aspasius’ commentary.
The contamination is present in a sometimes-deeper way and its effects are
philosophically more dramatic.
To begin with, a great deal of this contamination has nothing to do with the
terminology Aspasius uses, but solely with the interpretations he makes of
Aristotle’s text and the doctrines he ascribes to Aristotle by means of these
interpretations.
Further, even in those instances where it is indeed the terminology that
seems to indicate some amount of Stoic contamination, the use of the terminol-
ogy cannot, in those instances, be simply attributed to the common philosophi-
cal lexicon at hand during the commentator’s lifetime. This is obviously the case
when it can be proved that the Stoic locutions Aspasius used had not fell into
the “public domain,” so to speak, of his times (admittedly, not so many
instances would pass such a test); but this is particularly the case (we will see
at least one example in what follows) where the notions themselves expressed
by the Stoic or Stoic-inspired expressions Aspasius used find no correspondence
in Aristotle’s conceptual stock and therefore the commentator cannot be seen as
merely resorting to the philosophical koine of his time in order to illuminate
some difficult Aristotelian ideation.
In fact, if Aspasius was indeed nothing more than a “dutiful and orthodox
Peripatetic”, then those cases where he used an idiom other than the
Aristotelian one should be cases when he did not possess the latter, or decided
not to use it, but the former nonetheless fit the bill, at least in his view, to
express some underlying Aristotelian notion he was trying to construe; and all
10 See Barnes (1999, 5).
11 See, for instance, Moraux (1949, 1986), Bodéus (1986, 1995), Dorandi (2007).
12 See Mesquita (2013, 262–3).
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the more so if in these peculiar occurrences he formally purported to be intro-
ducing a Peripatetic concept or thought. Yet, as we shall see, this is not always
what happens in Aspasius’ commentary.
It is true that some points of contact between Aspasius and Stoicism have
already been mentioned in previous literature.13 These references, however, are
rare and episodic, and have never resulted in an exhaustive inquiry.
Without carrying out such an exhaustive inquiry in this paper, I would like
to go a little further than what I have been able to find in literature up to this
point, by selecting those points where the Stoic influence on the commentator is
most flagrantly evident, in order to contribute to a new appraisal of Aspasius’
philosophical affiliation.
I will restrict myself to the commentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics.
I will start with references of a more marginal character and then focus on the
aspects where the influence of Stoicism can be detected as philosophically more
serious and profound.
Art
In the context of the presentation of the different meanings of art in 2.16-2.26
(the commentary refers to the first sentence of EN, 1094a1-2: πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ
πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ)
the first two meanings are stated by Aspasius, oddly enough, not in canonical
and recognizable Aristotelian terminology, but by making use of the enigmatic
notion of a “system of propositions.”
This is the complete passage14:
Among them [i.e. the Peripatetics], “art” is spoken of in three senses. For example, the
genus of all the arts is called “art”: for they distinguish the arts, calling some productive,
some theoretical. One might define an art in this sense [the genus of all the arts] as a
system of propositions (σύστημα ἐκ θεωρημάτων) leading to a single end. In another sense,
they call an “art” the common genus of active art and productive art: for here they
distinguish by calling the one “art” and the other “science”, labelling all theoretical art
13 For example, Antonina Alberti, in “Il voluntário e la scelta in Aspasio”, shows that opposi-
tion to Stoic determinism by Aspasius coexists with – and, actually, is served by – what the
author calls a “stoicizing conception of choice” (Alberti 1999, 141). And Gauthier, in his
introduction to the translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, acknowledges that Aspasius “a
profondément subi l’influence de la morale stoïcienne” (Gauthier and Jolif 1970, I 1, 100).
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“science”. One might describe such an [active and productive] art as a system of proposi-
tions (σύστημα ἐκ θεωρημάτων) leading to actions or productions. They are also accus-
tomed to call productive art in particular “art”. Aristotle provides a definition of it, when
he says “an art is a productive state (ἕξις) accompanied by reason” (VI 4, 1140a7-8); he
means neither inductive nor syllogistic reason, but rather simple, artistic reason, such as
craftsmen in the arts employ.
It is quite clear that the vocabulary Aspasius uses in this passage to characterize
the first two meanings of “art” is not Aristotelian.
If we cross-refer the surveys made by Bonitz, regarding the Aristotelian
treatises, and by Liddell-Scott, regarding the use of the word in Greek literature,
we may conclude that, in Aristotle, σύστημα – a relatively rare term in his works
(there are only about five occurrences in the whole corpus) – usually appears in
the biological treatises, particularly in the Generation of Animals, with the
meaning of compound or composite whole15 and once with the meaning of
animal organism.16 However, it also occurs once with the meaning of literary
composition (in the Poetics)17 and once with the meaning of political regime or
organized government (in the Nicomachean Ethics itself).18 No occurrence of the
word can be found, however, in the sense that the Stoics will come to attribute
to it and that will progressively become, from then on, its primary meaning, that
is, the sense of system. This is to say that the concept is completely unknown to
Aristotle, since no other word with this meaning can be found in his lexicon.
On the other hand, θεωρήματα is normally used by Aristotle to refer to
objects of research or “contemplation”, that is, the objective counterpart of
θεωρία,19 or to designate the research itself, whether it is of dialectical,20
scientific,21 or undetermined nature.22 What never occurs in Aristotle is the
expression used to refer to propositions, as is the case in Aspasius’ commentary.
The closest to this usage that we can find in Aristotle is, in the context of the
discussion of the status of mathematical objects, in Metaphysics M-N, the use of
the expression to refer to mathematical theorems.23 However, the expression is
15 In GA III 1, 752a7, and III 9, 758b3.
16 GA II 4, 740a20.
17 Po. 18, 1456a12.
18 EN IX 8, 1168b32.
19 For example, in Mem. 1, 450b25, EN IX 4, 1166a26-27, and Rh. I 4, 1359b8.
20 Top. I 11, 104b1.
21 Mete. I 3, 339b9; I 3, 339b37; I 8, 345b2; Insomn. 2, 455a25.
22 Po. 19, 1456b19, and, perhaps, EE I 1, 1214a9. θεώρημα also occurs at least once in the
original sense of sight: see DivSomn 2, 463b19 (and cf. MA 7, 701a10, with the meaning of
contemplation).
23 See Metaph. M 8, 1083b18; N 2, 1090a13; N 3, 1093b28; N 6, 1093b15.
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always used there in the sense of the demonstrable propositions of mathematics
and never in the general sense of a proposition. There is nothing, therefore, in
Aristotelian nomenclature that provides the grounds for or justifies the sense in
which Aspasius uses the term in those passages.
It is true that θεώρημα is not the standard Stoic term for “proposition”, in its
logical sense, that is, in the sense of the content expressed by a declarative
sentence. For this sense of the term “proposition” the standard Stoic term is
ἀξίωμα, which designates one of the subclasses of the λεκτά, the incorporeal
“sayables”. Instead, Θεώρημα usually means, in the Stoic texts, principle or
general rule.24
Nevertheless, the relevant point here, as was marginally pointed out by
David Sedley,25 is that Aspasius uses the expression θεώρημα in a sense that
has no correspondence in the Aristotelian lexicon, a sense which clearly can
only be translated as proposed by David Konstan, that is, as “proposition”, and
that the entire notion of a “system of propositions” is undeniably Stoic. The use of
the term in this sense is, thus, indicative of the occurrence of a Stoic concept,
regardless of whether the Stoics themselves used it in that sense or not.
Furthermore, the concept of a “system of propositions” is critical for the
Stoic conception of science and for its conception of the different scientific
branches, disciplines, and activities.
In his inventory of the meanings attributed by the Stoics to ἐπιστήμη,
Joannes Stobaeus states26:
Scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is [firstly] a cognition (κατάληψις) which is secure and
unchangeable by reason. It is secondly a system of such epistemai (σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν
τοιούτων), like the rational cognition of particulars which exists in the virtuous man. It is
thirdly a system of expert epistemai (σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τεχνικῶν), which has intrinsic
stability, as the virtues do. Fourthly, it is a tenor (ἕξιν) for the reception of impressions
which is unchangeable by reason, and consisting, they say, in tension and power.
Looking past the dense conceptual grid that permeates this text, which we will
not deal with for the time being, what ensues from this is that the fundamental
character of scientific knowledge, for the Stoics, is stability and immutability.
This, consequently, is the first and most basic sense of ἐπιστήμη: a cognitive
apprehension that is “ensured and immutable through reason” (κατάληψιν
24 See: Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis 1035A (= SVF II 42 = LS 26C); Cicero, De fato 12–15
( = LS 38E); Diogenes Laertius VII 125 ( = SVF III 295); Stobaeus, Eclogae II 63.6-24 ( = SVF II
280 =LS 61D).
25 Who, as mentioned above, finds this selfsame contamination in another step of Aspasius’
commentary: see supra, n. 9.
26 Eclogae II 73.16-74.3 = SVF III 112 = LS 41H (translated by Long-Sedley; the emphasis is mine).
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ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου). To know something scientifically is to
apprehend it through an adequate representation – but this must be a repre-
sentation that does not change, nor is it altered, nor does it disappear.
However, these predicates, if not bestowed upon it, are at least guaranteed
by the systematic character that reason provides to the concatenation of cogni-
tive representations that primarily constitute scientific knowledge.27 And, in this
sense, the systematic character of science ends up being the main ingredient of
its nature as science. In other words, science as science is a system; and, since
cognitions or cognitive representations can only be organized by science when
formulated in a declarative form, one can even add to this that science is
necessarily a system of propositions.
The same thing can be said about a different, albeit kindred, notion from the
Stoic epistemological lexicon and one that is particularly relevant for our dis-
cussion – the notion of τέχνη.
Here is what Olympiodorus tells us about this notion in his commentary on
Plato’s Gorgias28:
Cleanthes says that “expertise (τέχνη) is a tenor (ἕξις) which achieves everything methodically
(ὁδῷ πάντα ἀνύουσα)”. This definition is incomplete. After all, nature also is a tenor which
does everything methodically. That is why Chrysippus added “with impressions”, and say
that “expertise is a tenor which advances methodically with impressions” (τέχνη ἐστὶν ἕξις
ὁδῷ προϊοῦσα μετὰ φαντασιῶν)… Zeno says that “an expertise is a systematic collection of
cognitions (σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων) unified by practice for some goal advantageous in life”.
Once more, now in regard to τέχνη, the systematic or “methodical” character of
science for Stoicism is apparent.
In this context, the occurrence of the notion of a “system of propositions”
(σύστημα ἐκ θεωρημάτων) in the Aspasian discussion on the meaning of τέχνη
becomes very suggestive – suggestive, namely, of a distinctive proximity to Stoicism.
Now, what is particularly interesting – and significant – is that Aspasius resorts
to the Stoic notion of technê when he tentatively puts forward his own definition of
the term.29 When, instead, he is in possession of Aristotle’s definition,30 the Stoic
vocabulary is no longer present, and, naturally, he uses Aristotelian vocabulary.
27 Even if submitted to a deep revision, the Platonic ancestry of this notion is pretty evident
here, as in many other elements of Stoic philosophy: see Men 98a and Tht. 201d.
28 In Platonis Gorgiam commentaria 12.1.09-19 = LS 42 A (translated by Long-Sedley; the
emphasis is mine).
29 2.18-19: “one might define an art in this sense as…” (ὁρίσαιτο δ’ ἄν τις τὴν οὕτω λεγομένην
τέχνην…); 2.22: “one might describe such an art as…” (τὴν δὲ τοιαύτην ὑπογράψειεν ἄν τις…).
30 In the case of the third sense, in 2.24: “Aristotle provides a definition of it…” (ἀποδίδωσι δὲ
αὐτῷ λόγον ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης…).
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This seems to suggest that, more than just a proximity, there is a real Stoic
influence at the foundation of Aspasius’ philosophical position, an influence that
erupts and manifests itself when he lacks Aristotelian references. (In this context,
the fact that Aspasius calls the Peripatetics “them” at the beginning of the excerpt,
which is downplayed by Barnes,31 may prove itself meaningful in this case.)32
Of course, it could be said that this is one of those lapses in vocabulary,
common in the late Hellenistic and Imperial periods, which Barnes alerts us to,
that are of no use to identify or denounce the philosophical allegiance of an
author.
The problem is that, in order for this to be the case, one would have to
envisage it as a non-Aristotelian way of saying something that Aristotle did say
or, at least, could have said, that is, as a way to translate an Aristotelian thesis
into a non-Aristotelian idiom (and note that Aspasius is explicitly trying to spell
out here the definitions of a Peripatetic concept).
It is not at all clear, however, what could correspond, in Aristotle, to this
conception of τέχνη as a “system of propositions”, because from the outset there
is nothing in his work that could correspond to such a notion.
In Aristotle’s analyses of τέχνη, as they are expounded in the Metaphysics
and in Nicomachean Ethics,33 nothing substantiates such a conception. And the
fact is that a kind of hyper-rationalist reductionism shines through this concep-
tion as having very little to do with Aristotle.
Further, it is surely significant that, when Aspasius puts forward the first
two Peripatetic senses of “art”, he chooses not to use the model conveniently
provided by Aristotle’s definition of τέχνη in its third sense, but prefers instead
to resort to a conceptual grid (σύστημα ἐκ θεωρημάτων) that, as we have seen, is
not present and has no equivalent whatsoever in the Stagirite’s thought.
Virtue
Another sign of Stoic influence occurs shortly before, when, at the beginning of
the commentary, Aspasius confronts theoretical and practical philosophy.
31 See Barnes (1999, 6–8).
32 Moreover, the similarity between Aspasius’ definition of τέχνη and the one Olympiodorus
attributes to Zeno of Citium is noteworthy. In the first case, we have: σύστημα ἐκ θεωρημάτων
εἰς ἓν τέλος φερόντων (2.19); and in the second: σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένον
πρός τι τέλος εὔχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. It is difficult to conceive of such a similarity as a mere
coincidence.
33 Respectively: Metaph. A 1, 981a5-b7; EN VI 4, 1140a1-23.
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In fact, going almost unnoticed, continence (ἐγκράτεια) appears listed there
as one of the virtues: καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων
τοιούτων ἀρετῶν.34
Now, as is well known, Aristotle does not regard continence as a virtue, as
he does not regard incontinence as a vice.
In the Ethics, this is perhaps most clearly stated in the following passage35:
In general incontinence and vice are of different kinds. For the vicious person does not
notice that he is vicious, while the incontinent person notices that he is incontinent (…).
Evidently, then, incontinence is not a vice, though presumably it is one in a way. For
incontinence conflicts with decision, while vice expresses decision. All the same, it is
similar to vice in its actions. Thus Demodocus attacks the Milesians: “the Milesians are not
stupid, but they do what the stupid people would do”; and in the same way incontinents
are not unjust, but will do injustice.
The Stoics, on the contrary, included ἐγκρατεία among the virtues and ακρασία
among the vices.
This is explicitly stated by Diogenes Laertius when he mentions the Stoic
classification of the virtues36:
Amongst the virtues, some are primary, some are subordinate to these. The following are
the primary: wisdom (φρόνησις), courage, justice, temperance. Particular virtues are
magnanimity (μεγαλοψυχία), continence (ἐγκρατεία), endurance (καρτερία), presence of
mind (ἀγχίνοια), good counsel (εὐβουλία). (…) Similarly, of vices some are primary, others
subordinate: e.g. folly, cowardice, injustice, profligacy are accounted primary; but incon-
tinence, stupidity, ill-advisedness subordinate. Further, they hold that the vices are forms
of ignorance of those things whereof the corresponding virtues are the knowledge.
The same lesson is preserved by Joannes Stobaeus,37 who presents it in a more
developed and complex way, namely by subsuming subordinated virtues and
vices under each of the primary virtues and vices: thus εὐβουλία and ἀγχίνοια
under prudence; καρτερία and μεγαλοψυχία under courage; αἰδημοσύνη and
ἐγκρατεία under temperance; etc. (Notice that, although Stobaeus adds several
virtues to the classification, the core of virtues mentioned both by Diogenes
Laertius and Stobaeus is the same, hence suggesting that both testimonies come
from a common source.)
34 1.17-18.
35 EN VII 8, 1150b35-1151a10 (here, as in all other citations of the Nicomachean Ethics, I cite the
translation by Terence Irwin).
36 VII 92.5-93 = SVF III 265 (translation by Hicks; the emphasis is mine).
37 See Eclogae II 7, 60.9 = SVF III 264.
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That is also what can be drawn from Epictetus’ words, according to the
anecdote attributed to him by Aulus Gellius38:
The same Epictetus, moreover, as we have heard from Favorinus, was in the habit of
saying that there were two vices which are far more severe and atrocious than all others,
want of endurance and want of self-control (et incontinentiam), when we do not endure or
bear the wrongs which we have to bear, or do not abstain from, or forbear, those matters
and pleasures which we ought to forbear. “And so,” he says, “if a man should take to heart
these two words and observe them in controlling and keeping watch over himself, he will,
for the most part, be free from wrongdoing, and will live a highly peaceful life.” These two
words, he used to say, were ἀνέχου and ἀπέχου (bear and forbear).
It is therefore clear that Aspasius yields here to a thesis that is Stoic and not
Aristotelian. The fact that this thesis was already recognized as Stoic in
Aspasius’ time (even if for no better reason than the motto “bear and forbear”
immediately became a classic of Stoicism), and the fact that he, as a commen-
tator of book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, was bound to know that this was
not an Aristotelian thesis, only deepens the enigma.
External Goods
If up to this point we have only touched upon ancillary and isolated aspects in
Aspasius’ commentary, a much stronger case can be built, unsurprisingly
enough, from his interpretation of the relation between virtue and happiness
in Aristotle and, in particular, in his interpretation of the role played by “exter-
nal goods” in happiness.
At this point, it is as if Aspasius knew Aristotle’s position on the subject well
enough to understand that Aristotle’s position was incompatible with any other,
namely the Stoic view, that reduces happiness to virtue, but, at the same time,
was inclined to harmonize the former with the latter, or read the former in light
of the latter, in such a manner that he was usually led to put forward inter-
pretations of the Aristotelian doctrine that, in practice, assimilate Aristotle’s
doctrine to the standpoint of the Stoics.
Let us look at this issue with the attention it deserves.
To begin, a schematic reminder of Aristotle’s position on this topic might be
helpful.
38 XVII 19.5-6 = Epictetus fr. 10 (translation by Oldfather; the emphasis is mine).
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As is known, Aristotle defines happiness as an activity of the soul in accor-
dance with virtue.39 At the same time, however, Aristotle also believes that no one
can be happy, no matter how virtuous he is, if he lacks a set of concurring factors,
which he calls “external goods” (ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά).40 Among these external goods are
good birth, offspring, friends, wealth, power, and honor (which he calls, in a
different context, “the greater of the external goods”).41
Aristotle presents two reasons for this.42
The first is instrumental and concerns the fact that the practice of virtue
itself requires certain material conditions. In his terms, “we cannot, or cannot
easily, do fine actions if we lack the resources”.43
The second reason is that the lack of certain external goods, such as good
birth, good offspring, and beauty, simply “mars our blessedness” (ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ
μακάριον).44
As he himself puts it45:
We do not altogether have the character of happiness if we look utterly repulsive or are ill-
born, solitary or childless, and have it even less, presumably, if our children or friends are
totally bad, or were good but have died.
In brief, for Aristotle, virtue is an essential part of happiness and its necessary
condition. It is not, however, its sufficient condition, because there will be no
happiness, or no complete happiness, in the absence of certain external goods.
For the Stoics, on the contrary, virtue is not only a necessary condition, but
also a sufficient condition for happiness.46
39 See EN I 7, 1098a16-17: ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετήν; EN I 8, 1098b31: ταύτης [ἀρετής] γάρ
ἐστιν ἡ κατ’ αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια; EN I 8, 1099b26: ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετὴν ποιά τις; EN I 13,
1102a5-6: ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ’ ἀρετὴν τελείαν); etc.
40 EN I 8, 1099a31-b8; I 8, 1099b26-28; I 9, 1100a4-9; I 10, 1100b22-1101a21; VII 13, 1153b17-19; X
8, 1078a23-b7; X 8, 1078b33-1079a17; cf. I 8, 1098b12-20.
41 EN IV 3, 1123b20-21.
42 See EN I 8, 1099a31-b8.
43 EN I 8, 1099a32-33. Cf. X 8, 1078a23-b7 and 1078b33-1079a17.
44 EN I 8, 1099b2.
45 EN I 8, 1099b3-6; see I 9, 1100a8-9.
46 See particularly: Diogenes Laertius VII 89 = SVF III 39 = LS 61A; VII 127 = LS 61I; Seneca,
Epistulae morales ad Lucilium 85.1, 17–19. It could be said that to speak of virtue as a sufficient
condition for happiness is too weak of a statement for Stoic ethics, where the relation between
virtue and happiness is rather one of identity. The point is controversial (note, for instance, that
the texts referred to in this footnote affords both interpretations), but I do not want, nor need, to
engage in such a controversy here. In fact, I do not purport to be presenting here the best
possible interpretation of the Stoic position on the relation between happiness and virtue (or the
best possible interpretation of the Aristotelian position, for that matter). My aim is rather to find
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Epictetus expresses this suggestively when he says47:
Who then is a Stoic? Show me a man moulded to the pattern of the judgements that he utters,
in the same way as we call a statue Phidian that is moulded according to the art of Phidias.
Show me one who is sick and yet happy, in peril and yet happy, dying and yet happy, in exile
and happy, in disgrace and happy. Show him me. By the gods I would fain see a Stoic.
This is the second of the six paradoxa stoicorum that Cicero lists and discusses in
the essay by the same name and that he effectively sums up, in Greek, in the
following way: ὅτι αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν.
The paradox’s rationale can be tentatively reconstructed as follows.
The basic thesis of Stoic ethics is that only virtues are unconditionally good
and only vices are unconditionally bad.48 In fact, everything else (health,
beauty, strength, wealth, power, honor, etc.) can be rightly or wrongly used,
that is, virtuously used, for good, or viciously used, for bad, and, therefore, from
a moral point of view, it is neither good nor bad, but indifferent. Hence, aside
from the class of goods and the class of evils, the Stoics acknowledged the class
of things morally indifferent (αδιάφορα).49
However, things morally indifferent are not all equal, nor indifferent, from
other points of view. Namely, they can be distinguished from the point of view of
their appropriateness (οἰκείωσις) to human nature. According to this criterion,
the Stoics put forward a new triadic division, a division of indifferent things this
time, between: preferential indifferent things (προηγμένα), which, although
neither good nor bad, are valuable things (ἄξια) because they are fitting to our
nature, inasmuch as they preserve or support it (for example, health, wealth,
power, etc.); non-preferential indifferent things (ἀποπροηγμένα), which are the
opposite of the former (illness, poverty, frailty, etc.); and the indifferent indif-
ferent things, so to speak, that is, those things that are doubly indifferent, both
from the point of view of morality and from the point of view of their value for
the preservation of our nature.50
a common conceptual ground for both Aristotle and the Stoics’ respective positions in this
regard, a ground that permits us to set them apart effectively and by doing so to locate
Aspasius’ reading in between the two. The vocabulary of conditions, as unsatisfactory as it
may be to impeccably capture the Stoic thesis, provides, I think, such a ground.
47 Dissertationes II xix 23.1-25.1 (translation by Matheson).
48 See: Diogenes Laertius VII 101–103 = LS 58A; Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos XI
22–26 = SVF III 75 = LS 60G; Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato 199.14-22 = SVF III 658 = LS 61N.
49 See: Diogenes Laertius VII 101–103= LS 58A; VII 104–105 = SVF III 119 = LS 58B; VII
160 = SVF I 351 = LS 58G.
50 See: Stobaeus, Eclogae II 79.18-80.13 = LS 58C; II 83.10-84.2 = SVF III 124 = LS 58D; 84.18-
85.11 = SVF III 128 = LS 58E; Cicero, De finibus III 17, 20–22 = LS 59D; Epictetus, Dissertationes II
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Now, happiness is, for the Stoics, “the rational selection of things according
to nature”51 and this definition must be read literally, in the sense that happiness
already consists of the adequate selection of the (indifferent) things that, at each
moment and for each circumstance, are convenient to the nature of the agent,
and, therefore, should be preferred by him, whether they are attained or not.
However, for Stoicism, only the wise man knows how to rationally select
what is appropriate to nature. And since to be wise and to be virtuous are one
and the same thing,52 we may conclude that virtue is sufficient for happiness,
because conversion to virtue is a sufficient condition to rationally select what is
proper to each one’s nature and, thus, to be happy.
This thesis is noticeably consistent with the idea that, once the causal chain
of events is recognized, and recognized in its necessity, that is, once “fate”
(εἱμαρμένη) is acknowledged, the only rational attitude consists in accepting it
in such a way that the wise man, who is the incarnation of reason on a human
level, spontaneously and voluntarily accepts it and is, in this sense, happy. One
is happy, therefore, in the terms of the definition, only by rationally selecting
things according to nature – which can be done precisely by being wise, which
is to say virtuous.
Diogenes Laertius seizes this connection rather well when he says53:
This very thing [the end] constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of
life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man
with the will of him who orders the universe.
Given this, one may ask: does Aspasius’ commentary present us with unmistakable
signs that the commentator knows each one of the philosophical positions we have
summed up and, furthermore, that he is conscious of the difference between them?
I believe this is the case.
At several different times, Aspasius shows that he recognizes Aristotle’s
thesis that virtue is not sufficient for happiness and that happiness requires
6, 9 = SVF III 191 = LS 58J; Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis 1048a= SVF III 137 = LS 58H;
Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicus XI 64–67 = SVF I 361 = LS 58F.
51 The definition is attributed to the Portico’s fifth scholarch, Diogenes of Babylon (c. 230–140
a.C:): “to act rationally by selecting things in accordance to nature” (τὸ εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν
κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ)” (Diogenes Laertius VII 88.9-10 = SVF III DB 45). See: Stobaeus, Eclogae II
76.9-15 = SVF III DB 44= LS 58K; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata II xxi 179 Sylburg = SVF III DB
46; II xxi 129 Sylburg = SVF I 552.
52 See: Plutarch, De virtute morali 440e-441d=LS 61B; De Stoicorum repugnantiis 1034ce = LS
61C; Stobaeus, Eclogae II 63.6-24 = SVF III 280= LS 61D; II 66.14-67.4 = SVF III 560= LS 61G; II
59.4-60.2, 60.9-24 = SVF III 262 e 264 = LS 61H.
53 VII 88.6-9 (translation by Hicks).
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the concurrence of certain external goods,54 irrespective of how he interprets the
“externality” of those goods and the nature of their contribution to happiness.55
At the same time, Aspasius seems to also recognize the difference between
these theses and the ones of “others”, whom he never names, but who coincide
with the Stoics in the affirmation of the coextensivity of virtue and happiness.
This is what occurs, for example, when he invokes, against Aristotle’s thesis and
in “dispute” (ἀμφισβήτησις) with it, those for whom the external goods “con-
tribute nothing to happiness”56; or when he mentions those who would object to
Aristotle by saying that someone ill-born, hideous, or without children can also
be active and, “if he is active, it is necessary that he be happy”57; or again when
he mentions those who say that “virtue is the same thing as happiness”.58
However, the truly pertinent question is not whether Aspasius knows the
Aristotelian and Stoic positions regarding the relation between virtue and
54 See, for instance, 10.26-29, 30.31-33 and 34.10-13. These passages are, however, little more
than paraphrases of the commented text (in the first case, I 5, 1095b33-6a2; in the second, I 10,
1101a14-16). Furthermore, it is curious to notice, in the latter case, the difference in the
presentation of the external goods: Aristotle requires the happy man to be in possession of
“an adequate supply of external goods” (καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον), while
Aspasius is content with the fact that nothing external disrupts or hinders virtuous activities
(καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκτός). As we shall see in the following pages, this difference is not
neutral from a theoretical point of view.
55 In fact, and oddly enough, Aspasius insists several times that external goods are said to be
so because they are corporeal and, in that sense, external to the soul (23.32-24.1: ἐκτὸς δὲ
ἀγαθῶν ἤτοι τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα· ἐκτὸς αὐτὰ λέγει ὡς πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν πάντα ἐκτὸς; cf. 32.14-15),
apparently disregarding Aristotle’s classification, where goods of the soul, goods of the body
and external goods are clearly distinguished: νενεμημένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν
ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα (EN I 8, 1098b12-13). Since it is not my purpose to
explore this matter, I shall not come back to it. However, I suggest that this can be related to the
notion that the soul “uses the body”, in particular “as a tool for actions”, precisely in the
commentary on this passage of EN I 8, 1098b12-20, and consider that both points create a clear
schism between Aspasius and “orthodox” Aristotelianism. As for Aspasius’ interpretation of the




58 See 25–20.26. In the latter case, the concepts used in the description suggest that Aspasius
would have had the Cynics in mind (the first to second centuries AD witnessed a strong
reviviscence of Cynicism, with an impressive number of followers of the school after some
centuries of obscurity: Demetrius of Corinth, Demonax of Cyprus, Agathobulus of Alexandria,
Peregrinus Proteus, Theagenes of Patras, Oenomaus of Gadara, Pancrates of Athens, Crescens of
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happiness and whether he recognizes them in their differences, as we have
already seen that he does, but what he will do with such knowledge.
Now what he seemingly does, in the concrete circumstance of the commen-
tary, is acting as though he were akratic, by not mobilizing this knowledge when
he needs to identify and explain the contents of certain passages where the
Aristotelian theses under consideration occur, and, on the contrary, by always
disposing himself to weakening those theses and drawing them closer to Stoic
theses even to the extent of reducing them to the latter.
There are numerous examples of this attitude in Aspasius’ commentary.
They can be organized by an ascending order of gravity as follows: cases of
mere interference, in which the interpretation of Aristotle is disturbed, and
sometimes equivocated, through the interposition of motifs of Stoic origin;
cases of interlacement or overlapping, in which Aspasius’ interpretation
denounces the mixture, or even the confusion, between Peripatetic and Stoic
doctrines; and cases of pure and simple contamination, where the interpretation
put forward for Aristotle’s passage is a Stoic or Stoic-influenced interpretation.
Let us begin with the cases of simple interference.
One particularly interesting instance takes place when Aspasius tries to
understand the variations that, according to Aristotle, affect goods.
In the passage in question, Aristotle states59:
Moreover, what is fine (τὰ καλά) and what is just, the topics of inquiry in political science,
differ and vary so much that they seem to rest on convention only, not on nature. Goods,
however, also vary in the same sort of way, since they cause harm to many people (διὰ τὸ
πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν); for it has happened that some people have been
destroyed because of their wealth, others because of their bravery (ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν).
Aspasius comments on the passage as follows60:
There are also, in regard to other goods, those that are not noble but are merely called
good (ἃ καλὰ μὲν οὔ, καλεῖται ἀγαθὰ δὲ μόνον), for instance wealth and health; Aristotle
adds courage as well, which is indeed a noble thing (ἥτις ἤδη καλόν).
The interest of this instance is that we see Aspasius blatantly unsettled by
Aristotle’s text, particularly by its presentation of courage as something that,
along with wealth, can also destroy people.
The reason for this difficulty is that he reads the difference between goods
mentioned by Aristotle through a distinction of those that are morally good (the
59 EN I 3, 1094b15-19.
60 7.14-16.
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“noble ones”, τὰ καλά) and those that are good in an extra-moral sense, a
distinction that is not Aristotelian but Stoic.
Hence, it is inconceivable to him that wealth and courage are coupled in the
same lesson. “Mere goods”, that is, goods without moral content such as wealth,
he would say, certainly can lead an agent to disgrace if they are used without
moral criterion. Virtues, on the contrary, are unconditionally good and, there-
fore, since they cannot be wrongly used, they also could never harm anyone.
This instance reveals, therefore, an implicit conflict between the commented
text and the commentator’s theoretical assumptions, a conflict displayed in the
polite strangeness shown by Aspasius in the face of Aristotle’s examples.
Another good example of interference would be Aspasius’ interpretation of
the passage where Aristotle talks about the virtuous man’s behavior when facing
major misfortunes.61 Its analysis would force us, however, into an excursus that
would be disproportionate when compared to the relevance of its result. I will
therefore refrain from commenting on the passage for now.
Let us now address the cases of overlap between Stoic and Aristotelian
doctrines.
We will start with an admittedly minor example, which is almost a lapsus
linguae.
Each time he makes reference to external goods such as health or wealth,
that is, to the preferential things of the Stoics, Aspasius uses an intriguing
formula: “goods that one can use well or not well”.62
This formula is suggestive because it literally involves an interlacing of
Aristotelian and Stoic doctrines: Aspasius recognizes that health and wealth
are goods, just as Aristotle does; but he distinguishes them as a Stoic would,
which is to say as something that can be used well or not well. The result is a
mixed wording, partly Aristotelian (τὰ ἀγαθά) and partly of Stoic inspiration (οἷς
ἔστιν εὖ καὶ μὴ εὖ χρήσασθαι).63
61 30.18-25, commentary on EN I 10, 1100b28-1101a13.
62 Thus in 5.27-28: “they [the Peripatetics] also call capacities those goods that it is possible to
use well or not well, for example wealth and health” (ὀνομάζει δὲ δυνάμεις καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐκεῖνα,
οἷς ἔστιν εὖ καὶ μὴ εὖ χρήσασθαι, οἷον πλοῦτον καὶ ὑγίειαν). Again in 32.12-14: “some things are
potentials: these are such things among the goods that one can use well or not well, for
example wealth and health” (τὰ δέ εἰσι δυνάμεις. τοιαῦτα δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν, οἷς ἔστιν εὖ
καὶ μὴ εὖ χρῆσθαι).
63 One could think of Pausanias’ speech in Plato’s Symposium (181a) as a precedent to this.
However, the originality of Aspasius’ formula does not consist in saying that things are only
good or bad as long as they are used well (rightly and virtuously) or not well (wrongly and
viciously), which is an idea that has, in fact, its roots in Plato (see also Lg. II 661a-662a, and cf.
R. X, 613a and Lg. III 697a). The originality of Aspasius’ formula lies, on the contrary, in saying
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The following situation is much more serious.
In the context of the critique of Plato’s theory of the idea of good, which he
develops in chapter 6, Aristotle introduces a distinction between goods “in
themselves” and goods “because of these”.64 He gives no examples of the latter,
but he does give the following examples of the former: “thinking, seeing, some
types of pleasures, and honors”.65
Aspasius comments on the distinction in the following way66:
There are differences among goods: some are goods in themselves, whereas others are so
on account of other things. These latter are called good because they are productive of
goods in themselves or “are preservative of them or preventative of their contraries”
(1096b11-12). These are not among the goods in themselves, but only those are that are
choiceworthy on their own account, for example virtues and honours (οἷον αἵ τε ἀρεταὶ καὶ
τιμαί). But medicine and all such things are good on account of other things. Perhaps they
would say that health and wealth and all such things are goods on account of other things
(for they are instruments of virtue). Of these [i.e. goods on account of other things], all those
that are productive of goods in themselves are productive goods, for example what is
pleasant is productive of pleasure and gymnastics of health, if indeed health is among
things that are good in themselves (εἴπερ ἔστιν ὑγίεια τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ ἀγαθῶν), while
learning and training (ἄσκησις) and hard work (πόνοι) are productive of virtue.
The signs of fusion with Stoicism are evident in this passage.
On the one hand, in his presentation of the goods in themselves, Aspasius
chooses to ignore all the examples given by Aristotle (thinking, seeing, certain
pleasures, honors) with the significant exception of the last one; no less sig-
nificantly, Aspasius also adds virtue to the examples, which does not occur in
the commented segment.67
that goods themselves can be used well or not well, thus implying an implicit disbelief or
mistrust in the very criterion that led to acknowledge them as goods in the first place. The
difference between the two theses is still more visible in the way middle Platonists, like
Alcinous and Apuleius, who were more or less contemporary to Aspasius, presented Plato’s
doctrine on ‘exterior goods’. They are both very emphatic in saying that things like health,
beauty or wealth are not goods strictly speaking (μηδὲν εἶναι καθάπαξ ἀγαθόν… ea non simpli-
citer bona nuncupanda sunt…), but are only goods when used virtuously: see Alcinous,
Didaskalikos XXVII ii 8–10; Apuleius, De Platone II I 221, II x 235, II xii 237.
64 EN I 6, 1096b13-14: δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ’ ἂν τἀγαθά, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ’ αὑτά, θάτερα δὲ
διὰ ταῦτα.
65 Τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί (EN I 6, 1096b17-18). I slightly changed Irwin’s
translation here.
66 13.24-14.2 (the emphasis is mine).
67 It is also interesting to notice that Aspasius describes both as “choiceworthy on their own
account” (ὅσα δι’ αὑτὰ αἱρετά), which would be undoubtedly accepted by Aristotle in the
context of the current discussion, but contributes to obscure the fact that the only thing in
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On the other hand, the passages we have highlighted 68 show the difficulty
Aspasius has in dealing with health and wealth, that is, with two of the more
relevant Stoic προηγμένα, as being goods, or, at least, as being goods in
themselves. However, the excerpt by Aristotle seems to leave no doubt that he
would gladly add such goods to his list of ἀγαθά καθ' αὑτά, alongside pleasures
(“some types of pleasures”) and honors, for example.
Lastly, the terms ἄσκησις and πόνος are used by Aspasius in this passage in
the philosophical sense lent to them by Cynicism, and later adopted by Stoicism,
especially during the Imperial period, a sense that is utterly absent in Aristotle.
For Cynicism – in the same way as afterward for recent Stoicism, in a reformu-
lated way –, “ascetic” training of the body and soul, as well as the voluntary
adoption of an austere and toilsome life, constitute the path to virtue.69 But such
concepts never occur with this meaning in Aristotle, who, nevertheless, as a
contemporary of Diogenes of Sinope, certainly knew the Cynic ideals.70
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that we find here the first of several
occurrences of a typically Aspasian interpretation of external goods. This is,
namely, the interpretation of those goods (more precisely, of the goods “on
account of other things”) as “instruments of virtue”,71 that is to say, as goods
Aristotelian ethics that is unconditionally chosen for itself is the one for the sake of which all
others are chosen, that is to say, happiness, thus turning virtue itself into an instrumental good.
68 13.29-30: ἴσως δ’ εἴποιεν καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα δι’ ἕτερα ἀγαθὰ εἶναι,
ὄργανα γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς; 14.1: εἴπερ ἔστιν ὑγίεια τῶν καθ’ αὑτὰ ἀγαθῶν.
69 In regard to the Cynic school, see, for Antisthenes of Athens: Diogenes Laertius VI 2, 10–12
( = fr. 19 Decleva-Caizzi); Stobaeus, Florilegium II, 31, 68 ( = fr. 64 Decleva-Caizzi); Gnomologium
Vaticanum 1 ( = fr. 96 Decleva-Caizzi); Diogenes Laertius VI 3.2 ( = fr. 108a Decleva-Caizzi);
Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. 73.1-3 ( = fr. 108b Decleva-Caizzi); Aulus Gellius IX 5 3–4 ( = fr.
108c Decleva-Caizzi); Clement of Alexandria, Stromata II 20, 121.1 ( = fr. 108d Decleva-Caizzi);
Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica XV 13, 7.1-8.1 ( = fr. 108e Decleva-Caizzi); and for Diogenes of
Sinope: Diogenes Laertius VI 70, 1–12; Stobaeus, Florilegium IV, 32a, 11; Stobaeus, Florilegium
IV, 32a, 12. In regard to the Stoics, see, for example, Seneca, Epistulae morales ad Lucilium
78.13-16, and Epictetus, Dissertationes, passim.
70 Moreover, Aristotle always uses both terms only in their current meanings and without any
philosophical commitment. Hence, πόνος for physical pain (HA VII 4, 584a4; IX 9, 586b28 and
30), suffering (HA II 4, 501b27; GA III 2, 752a34; IV 4, 773a17) or toil (Long. 5, 466b14; GA IV 6,
775a35; Pol. VIII 4, 1338b41; see VII 15, 1336a25); and ἄσκησις for training, usually military
training (Pol. II 6, 1271b6; VII 13, 1333b39; VIII 6, 1141a8), but also gymnastic training (Pol. IV 1,
1288b13) or habituation to cold (Pol. VII 15, 1136a21). “Training of virtue” occurs once (ἄσκησίς
τις τῆς ἀρετῆς), in EN IX 9, 1170a11-12, but with the sense of cultivation of virtue, as Irwin
correctly translates; furthermore, Cynics do not train virtue: they train themselves, body and
soul, for virtue.
71 See 13.29-30: ἴσως δ’ εἴποιεν καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα δι’ ἕτερα ἀγαθὰ εἶναι,
ὄργανα γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς.
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that only become such when virtue uses them for the practice of good deeds. The
same interpretation occurs repeatedly in Aspasius’ text and is particularly
apparent when he comments on the passage where Aristotle argues for the
first time in favor of the need of external goods to achieve happiness.72
However, Bob Sharples has already shown that this interpretation goes back to
Arius Didymus, a Stoic (or Eclectic?) philosopher of the late first century BC, and
there is no need, therefore, to address it here.73
Let us, then, look at the more serious cases, the cases of pure and simple
contamination.
These cases are those where Aspasius really tends to assimilate happiness
and virtue, or, against clear statements made by Aristotle on this matter, to
minimize or practically annul the intervention of external goods on happiness.
I shall mention three passages that contain these circumstances.
The first is, once again, essentially of a caricatural nature.
It is the passage where Aspasius comments on Aristotle’s reflections on the
importance of knowing the supreme good, and thus on the importance of ethics,
in the following terms74:
But since there is an end of all things that are practicable, which we choose for itself, it is
obvious that this would be the good and the best one: for the other ends are for the sake of
this. A knowledge of it also has enormous importance for living nobly. For those who
choose different actions at different times and do not look to one thing live at random and
never attain the good. But if one observes happiness and the human good, setting this as
one’s target like an archer, and directs all one’s actions toward it, then it is entirely
necessary that one become happy and live one’s whole life nobly (ἀνάγκη πᾶσα αὐτὸν
εὐδαίμονα γενέσθαι καὶ καλῶς διαβιῶναι).
72 See 23.32-24.9. The interpretation returns, although in a way that is more syntonic with the
Aristotelian position, in 26.14-24 and again in 32.12-15.
73 However, Sharples does not conclude in favor of a Stoicizing character of the interpretation
itself, but rather the opposite. I recall here the relevant passage: “Diogenes Laertius (5.30)
reports it as Aristotle’s view that happiness is a sumplêrôma from the three classes of goods,
goods of the body, goods of the soul and external goods. This was the view of the second-
century B.C. Peripatetic Critolaus, according to Arius Didymus; Arius himself rejects it, arguing
that only the goods of the soul are parts of the end, and that virtue employs the other classes of
goods. And at 24,3 Aspasius himself asserts that external goods are needed, not as parts of
happiness or as completing it, but as instruments for noble actions. However, while the view of
Arius and Aspasius may give a lesser role to external goods than did Critolaus, it still regards
them as necessary in a way the Stoic view does not. Becchi is right to regard Aspasius’ treatment
of this issue as anti-Stoic.” (Sharples 1999: 87)
74 5.10-17 (the emphasis is mine).
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Now compare this to what Aristotle actually says in the passage Aspasius is
commenting on75:
Then surely knowledge of this good [the best good (τὸ ἄριστον)] is also of great importance
for the conduct of our lives, and if, like archers, we have a target to aim at, we are more
likely to hit the right mark (μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος).
Rather significantly, where Aristotle deems knowledge of the good as something
that can help us attain the good, without allowing the latter to be automatically
expected from the former, Aspasius deems knowledge of the good a sufficient
condition from where the good is “necessarily” derived.
Both the intellectualist deviation of Aspasius’ reading and the temptation to
make happiness rest on principles that are entirely dependent on man (on his
choices and his responsibility – here with respect to knowledge, later on, as we
will see, with respect to virtue) are undeniable.
If this were a single isolated case, the irrelevance of the deviation could be
conceded.
However, as it so happens, this is not an isolated case, which makes it an
early example of the interpretative rule we will witness in what follows.
The second occurrence of contamination regarding the Aristotelian doctrine
of external goods can be found in the commentary on the passage in which
Aristotle points out the convergence of the results of his own analysis with
generally accepted opinions (τὰ λεγόμενα) on the good,76 namely in regard to
the relation between virtue and happiness and the relation between happiness
and pleasure.
In his commentary, Aspasius states the following77:
In accord with what has been said, then, Aristotle has associated his own definition with
those who say that only virtue is happiness (συνῳκείωσε τὸν ὸὑτοῦ λόγον τοῖς μόνην τὴν
ἀρετὴν εἰποῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν). And he reconciles his own view with those who say that
happiness accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure is these things, that is, is all
the virtues or one of them, whether philosophy or practical intelligence, by the following:
there is a certain difference between “accompanied by pleasure” and “not without plea-
sure”. Those who say “accompanied by pleasure” make pleasure a part of happiness,
whereas those who say “not without pleasure” do not say that pleasure is a part but rather
that it is one of the things without which there cannot be happiness. His definition fits
these latter: for even if it was not posited in advance that happiness is an activity in accord
with complete virtue accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure, it is nevertheless
clear that pleasure invariably accompanies noble actions (ἀλλὰ δῆλόν γέ ἐστι ὅτι τάντως
75 EN I 2, 1094a22-24 (the emphasis is mine).
76 See EN I 8, 1098b20-1099b8.
77 22.15-26 (the emphasis is mine).
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συνέπεται ταῖς ς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ἡ ἡδονή). That is why he says that a life of activities in
important matters in accord with virtue is in itself pleasant.
To name a first point: there is nothing in the passage which Aspasius comments
on that justifies his affirmation that Aristotle “has associated his own definition
with those who say that only virtue is happiness”.
In fact, what Aristotle states is78:
Our account agrees with those who say happiness is virtue [in general] or some [particular]
virtue (τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετήν τινα); for activity expressing virtue is proper to virtue (ταύτης
γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια).
It is clear that, in this statement, Aristotle is just recalling the previous definition
of happiness as “the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue” 79 in order to
compare it with some accepted opinions. It does not ensue from it in any way
that only virtue is happiness, as Aspasius attributes to him. On the contrary,
what Aristotle’s definition implies is that there is no happiness without virtue,
not that happiness and virtue are the same (or that virtue is enough for happi-
ness, which seem to be the only alternative way to interpret the statement τοῖς
μόνην τὴν ἀρετὴν εἰποῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν).
It is true that Aristotle, in the passage in question, puts forward several
arguments to prove that noble actions are pleasurable for those who perform
them and, therefore, virtuous practice is accompanied by pleasure. 80 But there
is a dangerous ambiguity in the way Aspasius understands this (“pleasure
invariably accompanies noble actions”: πάντως συνέπεται ταῖς καλαῖς
ἐνεργείαις ἡ ἡδονή). Actually, put in this way, it could be concluded that the
virtuous man experiences pleasure whenever he performs a virtuous action no
matter what the circumstances might be – for instance, he would experience
pleasure even when, under torture, he chose to do “the right thing” by not
giving away a companion, which is a consequence Aristotle would hardly be
willing to admit.81 Perhaps for that reason, Aristotle is always careful to say that
noble actions are pleasurable “in themselves” (καθ' αὑτά), 82 without adding
78 EN I 8, 1098b30-31.
79 Τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ’ ἀρετήν (EN I 7, 1098a16-17). I dissent
here from Irwin’s translation.
80 See EN I 8, 1099a7-21.
81 The fact is that Aristotle explicitly rejects that a man can be happy in such conditions:
“Some maintain, on the contrary, that we are happy when we are broken on the wheel, or fall
into terrible misfortunes, provided that we are good. Willingly or unwillingly, these people are
talking nonsense.” (EN VII 13, 1153b19-21)
82 See EN I 8, 1099a7, 1099a15, 1099a21.
252 António Pedro Mesquita
 - 10.1515/apeiron-2015-0028
Downloaded from PubFactory at 07/25/2016 11:59:37AM by apmesquita@netcabo.pt
via António Mesquita
that, in consequence, the virtuous man invariably feels pleasure in virtuous
practice, as Aspasius does.
In both cases, the forma mentis that inspires Aspasius’ interpretation of
Aristotle is, again, rather evident.
However, the moment where the commentator most flagrantly demonstrates
his inability to overcome the limitations of the theoretical framework with which
he addresses the issue of external goods in Aristotle is precisely when he has to
comment on the passage where Aristotle, in his own name and for the first time,
claims external goods are indispensable to happiness.83
After commenting on the first argument Aristotle puts forward to prove that
external goods are necessary for happiness (according to which the practice of
good actions implies certain material conditions),84 an argument he clearly
agrees with,85 Aspasius shows his embarrassment with the second argument,
according to which “deprivation of certain [external goods] – e. g. good birth,
good children, beauty – mars (ῥυπαίνουσι) our blessedness”.86
The passage speaks for itself87:
Some believe that what follows is said too loosely (μαλακωτέρως εἰρῆσθαι). For he says that
when people are deprived of some things they taint (ῥυπαίνειν) their success, “for example
[when they are deprived of] good birth, abundant offspring, beauty” (1099b3). For some
would say that it is possible even for someone who is of low birth and not handsome and
has no children to be active in important matters, and if he is active, it is necessary that he
be happy. Against these, one must say that Aristotle too praises such people, inasmuch as
they make good the lack of lineage or looks or any other such of which they are in need,
but nevertheless there inheres in them a kind of blemish by virtue of their excessively low
birth, for example if one should be the son of a man who has prostituted himself. For how
would this not be a taint, which perhaps a noble person might indeed wash away, but
nevertheless it would be an obstacle sometimes in regard to noble activities. For cities do
not authorize such people to carry out their greatest affairs. [Further,] he is calling “ugly”
not a person who is moderately deprived of beauty but rather, as he says, someone who is
wholly hideous and monstrous in form, for whom it is perhaps impossible to become
sagacious. For such people, for the most part, turn out monstrous [in character] as well.
But neither can one who is “solitary” or “childless” be happy. Perhaps a solitary person is
not even worthy (σπουδαῖος), and not just not happy: for to live alone for a human being is
83 EN I 8, 1099a31-b8.
84 EN I 8, 1099a32-b2 (commented in 23.32-24.9).
85 The statement made by Aristotle that “in many actions, we use friends, wealth and political
power just as we use instruments” (πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, καθάπερ δι’ ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ
πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως: EN I 8, 1099a33-b2) gives him the opportunity to enthusias-
tically develop the instrumental interpretation of external goods that was originally put forward
by Arius Dydimus, as referred to above.
86 EN I 8, 1099b2-3.
87 24.24-25.12 (the emphasis is mine).
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contrary to nature. Still less will someone be happy if he “has thoroughly bad children”, for
example, children who prostitute themselves, or who, “although they are good, have died”
(1099b5-6). One must be aware, concerning all that has been said, that magnitude of virtue
transcends these things, so that a virtuous person is not unhappy. But if all the above-
mentioned misfortunes should be present, they become an obstacle to happiness.
Aspasius’ uneasiness with this passage of the Ethics is evident. And the way he
devises to deal with the difficulties it poses for him consists in interpreting the
second argument in light of the first, as a simple reinforcement of it. However, it
is clear that, for Aristotle, this is a different argument, with which he wants to
add that, besides the external goods we use as “instruments”, there are also
those external goods without which no one can be happy, no matter how
virtuous he may be.88 For Aristotle, someone hideous can really be virtuous;
but, in spite of that, he is unlikely to be happy because the physical deformity
itself will act upon him as a permanent disturbance, or as a factor of dissatisfac-
tion that is incompatible with happiness. Even in a more evident way – at least
for us, who are not Stoics – someone whose children all have died may be
virtuous; but it is highly doubtful that person can be happy.
Furthermore, Aspasius not only misses the point of Aristotle’s second argu-
ment, he misses it on behalf of an interpretation of the examples used in the
argument that Stoicize it – an interpretation which is indebted to a Stoicizing
understanding of the relation between happiness and virtue. Why is it that the
ill-born cannot be happy? Because the realization of a relevant part of the
virtuous actions a free man should perform is barred to them, namely all actions
that are fulfilled in the public sphere. Why is it that the hideous cannot be
happy? Because physical deformity is indicative of moral deformity. Why is it
that the lonely cannot be happy? Because, the lonely are “not even worthy
(σπουδαῖος)”. That is to say, for Aspasius, the one who lacks external goods is,
after all, unhappy, because without them he is not even virtuous. It never occurs
to him that, when invoking the external goods necessary for happiness, Aristotle
is simply saying that, without such goods, the ill-born, the hideous, the lonely,
or, perhaps above all, individuals whose children all have died (an example that
88 Besides Aristotle’s own words in the passage Aspasius is commenting on (EN I 8, 1099a31-
b8), the example of Priam that is given twice in the first book (9, 1100a4-9, and 10, 1100b28-
1101a13) shows that it is not the case that external goods are, for the Stagirite, only indirect
means to happiness, namely by being ‘instruments of virtue’. In fact, even though his virtue
remained untouched, the want of external goods “marred Priam’s blessedness”, to paraphrase
Aristotle’s expression in 1099b2, and therefore “no one counts him happy” (I 9, 1100a9). The
want of external goods, therefore, directly affects human happiness and certain external goods,
at least, are by themselves factors of a happy life and not only as “instruments of virtue”. (I owe
this argument to a remark by the anonymous reviewer for Apeiron.)
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oddly Aspasius does not attempt to interpret), cannot attain that balanced life
which, although not possible without virtue, is not exclusively dependent on it.
Aspasius’ interpretation of Aristotle’s argument induces, therefore, a
decrease in the dependence of happiness on external goods in favor of an
increase in its dependence on virtue – and in this lies, precisely, the
Stoicization of the argument. The only opening Aspasius leaves consists in
expanding the dependence of happiness also in relation to those external
goods that virtue uses “as instruments”, a move which is, no doubt, too bold
for a Stoic, but nevertheless too shy for an “orthodox” Aristotelian.
It is more interesting at this point, however, to remark how the Stoic
influence operates and is insinuated in Aspasius’ interpretation. It does not
operate from the outside, by imposing itself on his commentary, or by opposing
itself to Aristotle as an alternative theory. It operates as if it were a legitimate
reading of Aristotelian theory. What Aspasius does is ask himself, for instance:
what can Aristotle mean by stating that no hideous person can be happy? And
the only answer that occurs to him is that Aristotle probably means that someone
with a monstrous body also has a monstrous character. This is to say that
Aspasius’ motivation is really to understand Aristotle and maybe even to be a
good Aristotelian. But it only occurs to him to do so and to be that by interpret-
ing Aristotle through the lens of Stoicism.
Yet, in the final part of his commentary on this passage, Aspasius goes
further and his confession of philo-Stoicism becomes almost official89:
Magnitude of virtue transcends these things, so that a virtuous person is not unhappy (ὥστε
μὴ εἶναινδυσδαίμοναμτὸν ἐνάρετον). But if all the above-mentioned misfortunes should be
present, they become an obstacle to happiness.
The Stoicizing interpretation does not seem to leave any room for doubt in this
case: in the thesis it points to (“a virtuous person is not unhappy”); in the
weakening of the “positive” doctrine according to which external goods are a
condition for happiness into the “negative” doctrine according to which exterior
evils are an “obstacle” (ἐμποδών) to happiness90; in the obvious over-restriction
of the Aristotelian position (only in the circumstance of all misfortunes coming
together in one person can they work as an obstacle to happiness); and even in
the language itself (ἐνάρετος, which is a Stoic term for the one who possesses
virtue, a term which does not even occur in Aristotle). 91
89 25.9-11 (the emphasis is mine).
90 This weakening occurs several times in the commentary on book I: for example, in 30.31-33,
which comments EN I 10, 1101a14-16; in 34.10-13, which comments EN I 13, 1102a5-6; etc.
91 It is a relatively late term, although already used by Chrysippus (SVF 295.6 and 330.2).
Aspasius uses it very often (we find 16 occurrences along the whole extant commentary).
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In short: to admit that, in extremis, the sum of all misfortunes can prevent
the happiness of the virtuous man is the furthest level of Aristotelianism that
Aspasius allows himself to reach regarding this issue.
This is, admittedly, a kind of Aristotelianism and not a kind of Stoicism; but
it is unarguably, as stated at the beginning, a kind of Aristotelianism that is
strongly influenced by Stoicism.
A Dutiful and Orthodox Peripatetic?
At this point, one may legitimately ask: is Aspasius “a dutiful and orthodox
Peripatetic”, as Barnes claims?
The question, although legitimate, is obviously rhetorical.
First of all, what could an orthodox Peripatetic be during the first to second
centuries AD, in the midst of such a period of philosophical eclecticism? Would
there be orthodox Peripatetics during an era of intense syncretism, such as
occurred during the era of Aspasius?
In any case, whether there were orthodox Peripatetics in his time or not, it
is pretty certain – as I hope this journey has made clear – that Aspasius was
not one of them. At the very least – and I will choose my words very carefully
here –, he should be reckoned with as a borderline heterodox Peripatetic or, if
you will, as a kind-of orthodox Peripatetic, an orthodox Peripatetic “as it
were”. The massive and systematic presence of Stoic influence that we have
witnessed in his commentary on the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics
would allow nothing else to be a fair description.
Dutiful Peripatetic, maybe, in the sense of a serious, diligent and hardwork-
ing interpreter of the Master, since, as we saw, it is always with the purpose of
understanding Aristotle that Aspasius falls into the arms of Stoicism. However,
his effort and his willingness are conditioned by a factor that is out of his
control: the theoretical parameters he uses to read Aristotle.
The impression this gives is that a previous philosophical background is
somehow automatically triggered in Aspasius when he faces “blank spaces”. At
the same time, this background resists and superimposes itself whenever it
stumbles upon a thesis with which it is theoretically incompatible.
The result of this unstable balance, or silent conflict, is something like a
“fusion” Aristotelianism, a syncretic philosophy of formal Peripatetic obedience,
but with a strong Stoic influence.
Without wanting to risk a hypothesis on the intellectual evolution of
Aspasius, it seems as though he were initially a Stoic who eventually joined
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Aristotelianism, but whose original philosophical upbringing stayed behind and
functioned as a structure for apprehension and interpretation.
Or should one rather suspect that an eclectic school of Aristotelian-Stoic
commentary existed during the first to second centuries AD, which perhaps went
back to Arius Didymus and to which Aspasius belonged? More so than the
previous one, this hypothesis, although tempting, rests on historical elements
that are unavailable to us.
Thus doubt remains regarding the history behind Aspasius’ commentary.
Aspasian Infidelities
The result of this exercise is admittedly far from astounding.
I did not prove, nor did I intend to prove, that Aspasius is not a dutiful
Aristotelian – if by “dutiful Aristotelian” one understands what I have just
suggested.
What I meant to show is that to understand Aspasius’ peculiar
Aristotelianism a fruitful method is to suppose that, before turning into a
“dutiful” Aristotelian, Aspasius started out as being a (probably also dutiful)
follower of Stoicism and that his previous affiliation left indelible marks on his
thought which appear consistently and regularly – a good number of which we
have pointed out in his commentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics.
As in a once painted – very well painted – wall, now and then we can see
where the previous painting residually lurks.
As with someone who has learned to proficiently master a foreign language,
the native language sometimes lets itself be seen, even if only through
intonation.
Something like this seems to be the case with Aspasius. Behind the impec-
cable Aristotelianism he adopted with manifest honesty and fervor, signs of a
previous enchantment sometimes break out.
These are, malgré lui, the infidelities of his zealous Aristotelianism.
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